Social progress, democracy, and economic growth  a case study of Ecuador by Andrango Brito, Johanna Estefanía
	  	  
UNIVERSIDAD	  SAN	  FRANCISCO	  DE	  QUITO	  USFQ	  
	  
	  
Colegio	  de	  Ciencias	  Sociales	  y	  Humanidades	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Social	  Progress,	  Democracy,	  and	  Economic	  Growth:	  A	  case	  
study	  of	  Ecuador	  
Artículo	  Académico	  
.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Johanna	  Estefanía	  Andrango	  Brito	  
	  
Relaciones	  Internacionales	  	  
	  
	  
	  
Trabajo	  de	  titulación	  presentado	  como	  requisito	  	  
para	  la	  obtención	  del	  título	  de	  	  
Licenciada	  en	  Relaciones	  Internacionales	  	  
	  
	  
	  
Quito,	  13	  de	  enero	  de	  2016
2	  	  
	  
UNIVERSIDAD	  SAN	  FRANCISCO	  DE	  QUITO	  USFQ	  
COLEGIO	  DE	  CIENCIAS	  SOCIALES	  Y	  HUMANIDADES	  	  
	  
	  
HOJA	  DE	  CALIFICACIÓN	  
	  DE	  TRABAJO	  DE	  TITULACIÓN	  
	  
	  
Social	  Progress,	  Democracy,	  and	  Economic	  Growth:	  A	  case	  study	  of	  Ecuador	  
	  
Johanna	  Estefanía	  Andrango	  Brito	  
	  
	   	   	  
Calificación:	   	   	  
Nombre	  del	  profesor,	  Título	  académico	   	   Diego	  Grijalva,	  PhD.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Firma	  del	  profesor	  	   	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Quito,	  13	  de	  enero	  2016	  
	   	  
3	  	  
 
Derechos de Autor 
Por	   medio	   del	   presente	   documento	   certifico	   que	   he	   leído	   todas	   las	   Políticas	   y	  
Manuales	   de	   la	   Universidad	   San	   Francisco	   de	   Quito	   USFQ,	   incluyendo	   la	   Política	   de	  
Propiedad	  Intelectual	  USFQ,	  y	  estoy	  de	  acuerdo	  con	  su	  contenido,	  por	  lo	  que	  los	  derechos	  de	  
propiedad	  intelectual	  del	  presente	  trabajo	  quedan	  sujetos	  a	  lo	  dispuesto	  en	  esas	  Políticas.	  
Asimismo,	  autorizo	  a	  la	  USFQ	  para	  que	  realice	  la	  digitalización	  y	  publicación	  de	  este	  
trabajo	   en	   el	   repositorio	   virtual,	   de	   conformidad	   a	   lo	   dispuesto	   en	   el	   Art.	   144	   de	   la	   Ley	  
Orgánica	  de	  Educación	  Superior.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Firma	  del	  estudiante:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _______________________________________	  
	  
	  
Nombres	  y	  apellidos:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Johanna	  Estefanía	  Andrango	  Brito	  
	  
Código:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201510_00105127	  
	  
	  
Cédula	  de	  Identidad:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1718198151	  
	  
	  
Lugar	  y	  fecha:	   	   	  	   	  	  Quito,	  	  enero	  de	  2016	  
 
 
 
4	  	  
AGRADECIMIENTOS 
Agradezco a mis padres y hermano, Juan Andrango, Elisa Brito y José Esteban por su amor, 
confianza y apoyo incondicional  durante mi carrera. A Diego Grijalva por la paciencia, 
apoyo y dedicación no sólo en la elaboración de este trabajo, sino durante mi carrera 
universitaria. A Valeria Romano, Andrea Proaño, Nicholas Gachet, Miguel Molina, Cristina 
Aguirre, Daniela Larrea, Andrea Fernández de Córdova, Cristina Martínez y  Enzo Fiallo; por 
llenar de alegría y aprendizajes mi años en la universidad. Finalmente a mis mejores amigas: 
Ana Ayala, Carolina Cedeño y Gabriela López por ser un pilar importante en mi vida. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5	  	  
 
RESUMEN 
Esta tesis analiza las relaciones endógenas existentes entre el crecimiento económico, el 
progreso social y la democracia, junto al efecto exógeno de los precios del petróleo para el 
caso ecuatoriano. Este análisis utiliza un modelo de corrección de errores de vectores 
cointegrados (VECM), que permite diferenciar las relaciones de corto plazo y largo plazo 
entre estas variables. Así, se evidenció que en el corto plazo, la variación de los precios del 
petróleo causa crecimiento económico, pero es prejudicial para el desarrollo humano y la 
democracia. Igualmente, se encontró una relación de causalidad bidireccional entre desarrollo 
humano e instituciones políticas. En el largo plazo, existe una relación positiva entre 
desarrollo humano y democracia hacia con el crecimiento económico. Mientras, el 
crecimiento económico y la democracia presentan un efecto positivo en el desarrollo humano 
en el largo plazo. 
 
 
  
Key words: Ecuador, Economic growth, social progress, democracy, VECM. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we analyze the endogenous dynamics between economic growth, social 
progress and democracy, along with the exogenous effect of oil prices in Ecuador. We 
use a vector error correction (VEC) model, which allows the differentiation of the 
short-run and long-run relationships between these variables. In the short-run, oil 
price variation Granger causes economic growth, but hinders human development and 
democracy. A bidirectional causality exists between human development and political 
institutions. In the long-run, there is a positive relationship from human development 
and democracy to economic growth. A long-run relationship also exists from 
economic growth and democracy to human development. 
 
Key words: Ecuador, Economic growth, social progress, democracy, VECM. 
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INTRODUCTION 	  
One of the main factors that determines the human development of countries is the 
way its society is organized, i.e. its institutions. Likewise, when a society’s 
inhabitants are more educated, they will demand better political institutions. These are 
both inherently desirable goals for a society. However, both political institutions and 
human development -more generally defined- are directly affected by economic 
growth. This endogenous relationship between economic growth, social progress and 
democracy is crucial in developing countries such as Ecuador, where democracy and 
political institutions are not consolidated and social progress has been volatile, but 
where strong economic growth during the last decade has raised people’s expectations 
of a changed society both socially and institutionally. Faced with the fall in oil prices 
that has occurred during the last 1½ years, Ecuador’s risk is that the progress achieved 
(mainly in terms of social indicators) may quickly disappear. In this paper, we take a 
longer run perspective (1972-2013) to analyze the endogenous dynamics between 
economic growth, social progress and democracy in the specific case of Ecuador.1  
 
The thesis is organized in five sections. The first presents a review of the literature on 
the endogenous relationship between economic growth, human development and 
democracy. The second section presents a historic description of these variables for 
the case of Ecuador. The third and fourth present the methodology used to analyze 
this relationship econometrically, as well as the results obtained. The fifth section 
concludes. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	  use	  the	  terms	  social	  progress	  and	  human	  development	  interchangeably.	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Literature Review 
 
The discussion on the relationship between social progress, democracy and growth 
has generated various conclusions, sometimes contradicting one another. Some 
studies demonstrate that democracy has a positive and significant effect on economic 
growth (e.g. Leblang, 1997). However, others establish that democracy diminishes 
growth in developing countries, because certain democratic regimes are not able to 
implement effective public policies (Baum and Lake 2003). Acemoglu et al. (2015) 
contradict this argument and show that democracy does generate economic growth: 
after a country democratizes, its GDP per capita increases by 20% in the following 25 
years. 
 
Democracy affects economic growth through economic reforms aimed at increasing 
investment in education and health, thus contributing to social progress (Acemoglu, 
Naidu, et al., Democracy Does Cause Growth 2015) (Baum and Lake 2003) 
(Doucouliagos and Ali 2008). Likewise, democratic regimes often spend more in 
social development, incur in less social repression, have more egalitarian tax systems 
and distribute social expenditure (Pourgerami 1988) (Acemoglu, Naidu, et al., 
Democracy Does Cause Growth 2015) (Baum and Lake 2003). Regional analyses 
show that in Latin America democracy has contributed more to economic growth than 
in other regions, e.g. in Asia (Doucouliagos and Ali 2008). In a similar fashion, Heo 
and Tan (2001) show that in 31% of developing countries, including Ecuador, 
democracy Granger causes economic growth.  
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From a general perspective, Limongi and Przeworski (1993) argue that although 
politics does affect economic growth, political regimes do not capture the whole 
effect. There are political factors beyond democracy and authoritarianism that have an 
effect on economic growth. Doucouliagos and Ali (2008) distinguish between 
political democracy and economic freedom, and their effects on growth. They argue 
that protection of property rights, labor market regulations and business credit are 
factors that contribute to economic freedom and have a positive and direct effect on 
economic growth, since these factors provide incentives for productive activities. But, 
political democracy, which encompasses rule of law, voice and accountability, 
government efficiency, political stability, and vigilance on corruption, does not have a 
direct effect on growth. In a similar way, Pourgerami (1998) and Feng (1997) 
demonstrate that democracy contributes to the expansion of civil liberties and political 
rights, which are elements that contribute to property rights and market competition, 
and therefore to economic development. They conclude that there is no trade-off 
between democracy and economic growth. 
The political factor that seem to limit economic growth and development the most is 
political instability. Alesina et al. (1996) argue that economic growth is lower in 
countries with high risks of government collapse than in politically stable ones. 
Political instability generates uncertainty, which reduces investment and economic 
growth. Likewise, Feng (1997), using simultaneous equations to account for the 
endogeneity between democracy, political instability and economic growth, finds that 
democracy has a positive indirect effect on economic growth by reducing political 
instability. 
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Miller (2015) highlights the variation within democratic regimes and shows that 
electoral authoritarian societies produce better results in education, health and gender 
equality than democratic regimes due to their greater governmental capacity. The 
author establishes that electoral authoritarian regimes have no free elections and 
unjust conditions that favor the regime, even though there are competitive elections. 
In this regard, Leblang (1997) states that autocratic regimes can implement public 
policies to improve wealth, but without any effect on economic growth. Furthermore, 
Martin and Plumper (2003) find that in countries with an average level of political 
participation, government expenditure is 2% less compared to pure democracies. The 
general conclusion is that government participation and expenditure in the economy 
varies at different levels of democracy. 
In contrast to Acemoglu et al (2015), Doucouliagos and Ali (2008), as well as Baum 
and Lake (2003), suggest that the relationship between democracy and growth takes 
place through an indirect effect. Specifically, Doucouliagos and Ali (2008) find that 
democracy contributes to human capital, increases the level of economic freedom, 
decreases inflation and create political stability, all of which contribute to economic 
growth. In this sense, they establish that democracy contributes to human 
development and latter boosts economic growth. Yet, they do not find a direct effect 
between democracy and economic growth. In the same way, Baum and Lake (2003) 
use Granger causality to show that democracy improves education, and public health, 
again indirectly contributing to growth. They find that neither public health nor 
education causes democracy. Regarding, this relationship between democracy and 
human development, other studies show that the time frame matters. Feng (1997) 
concludes that in the long-run continuous growth contributes to development, and that 
development also has a positive effect on democracy. In the short-run, however, 
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where a non-democratic regime is in place, economic growth will contribute to 
strengthen the dictator’s power and sacrifice democracy and development. Thus, the 
relationship between democracy and growth is positive in the long-run but negative in 
the short-run. 
In the same way that the relationship between democracy and growth can take 
different directions, the relationship between democracy and social development is 
not fully determined. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2013) demonstrate that 
democracy has a robust effect on tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, but there is no 
effect on inequality. These authors also show that inequality tends to grow after 
democratization. In addition, the relationship between democracy and human capital 
is endogenous: a more developed country has greater opportunities to sustain a 
democratic regime (Pourgerami 1988), and these regimes invest more in education. 
(Acemoglu, Naidu, et al., Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality∗ 2013). In the 
health realm, some studies show that democracy is positive correlated with life 
expectancy (Baum and Lake 2003). 
From a regional perspective, Brown and Hunter (2004) show that Latin American 
democracies during the period 1980-1997 invested more economic resources in 
education, specifically in primary education. 
In the end, the relationship between social progress, democracy and growth is not 
clear cut. The main issue is that these variables are mutually endogenous and thus it is 
empirically difficult to disentangle causality. Furthermore, while most empirical work 
has focused on the relationship between two of them, it is clear that the three variables 
interact in complex ways. For instance, democracy contributes more to economic 
growth when the population has greater percentage of secondary enrollment 
15	  	  
(Acemoglu, Naidu, et al., Democracy Does Cause Growth 2015).  
Ecuador’s social progress, politics, and economic growth 
 
To analyze the evolution of the Ecuadorian economy during this period, I rely on the 
work of Gachet et al. (2011), in which during 1967-2008 eight economic cycles are 
identified. Since this analysis includes 5 more years, the last cycle will include them. 
Before the first economic cycle analyzed by these authors, the country suffered a 
crisis due to the drop of revenues from banana exports, the main export from 1940-
1965, which led to a decrease of 3% in economic growth in 1966. In this year, the 
military dictatorship that governed the country since 1963 to 1966 was deposed, a 
provisional president took power and a new constitution was drafted. 
 
The first economic cycle (1967 – 1973) was characterized by the discovery of oil in 
1967, the construction of the Trans Ecuadorian pipeline and the beginning of the 
exploitation of the commodity in 1972. As shown in Figure 1, oil production boosted 
Ecuador’s economic growth and just one year after the beginning of the exploitation 
the country experimented the greatest growth in the period (13% in 1973). This first 
economic cycle was accompanied by a political crisis ending in February 1972 with a 
coup against Velasco Ibarra, who was in his fifth presidency and dictatorship. General 
Rodriguez Lara replaced Velasco Ibarra as the head of state and established a military 
dictatorship characterized by nationalism and extensive government spending. As a 
consequence, inequality dropped to its minimum in a decade, but inflation started to 
rise and at the end of 1973 it was 13,01%. 
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During the second economic cycle (1973-1981) the economy was characterized by 
high oil prices and their fall towards the end. In the political realm, a military 
triumvirate deposed General Rodriguez Lara and governed from 1975 to 1979. 
Finally democratization occurred in 1979. In 1974, the price of a barrel of oil was 
US$63, in 1974 it was US$70,42 and in 1980 it reached US$100,47 in real terms. 
These prices led to higher oil revenues and higher government expenditures, making 
the state the main actor of the Ecuadorian economy and the economy dependent on oil 
prices. During this period, the average GDP growth was 6,24%, presenting its 
maximum in 1974 with 11,2%, and its minimum in 1977 with a growth of 1,60% due 
to the decrease in oil revenues in previous years. As the dictatorship accelerated social 
expending, income inequality reached its minimum point in Ecuadorian history in 
1978 with a Gini index of 38,25. 
 
In the last years of the dictatorship, the triumvirate acquired significant debt in order 
to maintain economic activity. Foreign debt increased 142% in 1978 and 78% relative 
to the previous year. In 1978, the military triumvirate called for a Constituent 
Assembly and established a law of political parties in order to make feasible a 
democratic transition. After Ecuador’s democratization on August 10th, 1979 with the 
election of Jaime Roldós as president, the economy started to show weaknesses. The 
causes were the decrease of 7,56% in oil revenues in 1981 and the war against Peru in 
the same year. Finally, Jaime Roldós, who was considered a populist president, died 
in an airplane accident on May 24th, 1981. He left a country with large 
macroeconomic imbalances and rising unemployment (6% in 1981). 
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The third economic cycle according to Gachet et al (2011) comprehends the years 
between 1981-1986. This period was characterized by the volatility in oil prices, 
economic deceleration (Figure 1), the debt crisis and natural disasters such as El Niño. 
The government of Osvaldo Hurtado -who was Roldós vice-president and who took 
power after his death- had to face all these economic problems. Even though during 
the electoral campaign Hurtado proclaimed to belong to the center-left, in practice he 
implemented policies that represents a right-wing ideology. Following other Latin 
American countries and the lack of economic resources, the country defaulted on its 
debt in 1982. In order to stabilize the government finances, Ecuador signed an 
agreement with the IMF, which included measures such as the removal of subsidies to 
basic goods such as milk and flour, and also gasoline ( Gachet, Maldonado and Oliva 
2011). In 1982, for the first time after 12 years of fixed exchange rate the government 
devalued the sucre in order to boost Ecuadorian exports. At the same time, the 
government took responsibility and subsidized the private sector foreign debt through 
a process called sucretización. In this process, the state paid the debt of the private 
sector in dollars but the private sector paid back to the government in sucres.  Due to 
these unpopular measures, which ended up increasing unemployment and inequality, 
and the drop of 20,6% in the real minimum wage, the government of Hurtado faced 
political turmoil. 
 
In 1984, a right wing leader, León Febres Cordero became president. During his 
presidency, oil prices were still falling. As a pro-market president, Febres Cordero 
removed more subsidies and privatized some public enterprises. ( Gachet, Maldonado 
and Oliva 2011). He implemented the second sucretización, but with longer terms and 
a lower interest rates in comparison to the first sucretización and giving more 
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subsidies to the private sector. Nevertheless, in the social field, unemployment and the 
minimum wage decreased; and inequality grew 7 points between 1986-1988. In the 
political realm, Febres Cordero’s presidency was characterized by dictatorial actions 
and violations of human rights, including disappearances and torture. 
 
The fourth economic cycle (1986-1992) includes the two last years of Febres 
Cordero´s presidential term and the 4 years in power of the leftist president Rodrigo 
Borja. During this period, economic activity was stable but with low economic 
growth; on average it was 2,78%. The only year in which GDP fell was 1987 due to 
an earthquake that destroyed the oil pipeline and caused the suspension of oil exports. 
 
During the presidential term of Rodrigo Borja, oil prices recovered providing 
economic stability to the government and giving the president the opportunity to 
increase social spending. Even though most of his term was characterized by political 
stability, Rodrigo Borja faced riots and instability provoked by the indigenous 
movement. During his term unemployment decreased reaching its minimum in 1990 
with 6.1%, but inequality and inflation increased. 
 
During the years 1992-1997, the fifth economic cycle took place and liberalism and 
economic openness were the main objectives. In 1992, Sixto Durán Ballén, a right 
wing politician took power presenting as his main objective the reduction of inflation. 
Even though inflation was reduced reaching its minimum in 1995 at 22%, 
unemployment increased to 10.4% in 1996. His presidency was characterized by 
reducing the role of the state in the economy, and even though oil prices were not as 
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high as before, other traditional exports such as banana, shrimp and flowers 
contributed to economic growth. 
  
Like the previous president, Durán Ballén also had to face significant indigenous 
demonstrations. Nevertheless, the riots were not too destabilizing and Durán Ballén 
was the last president in 12 years that finished the presidential term.  In the social 
scope, Durán Ballén did not fight inequality, which in 1994 reached 54,32. Yet, the 
real minimum wage increased during his presidential term, especially in 1995 when it 
augmented in 18,65%. 
 
In 1995, Ecuador once again was immersed in a war against Peru that cost 
approximately 1% of GDP. In 1996, the populist leader Abdalá Bucaram took power, 
but lasted only six months, after the National Congress of Ecuador declared him 
“mentally disabled to rule the country”. His presidency was plagued by nepotism, 
multiple corruption cases and riots from different groups of the society. As a 
consequence, on February 6th, 1997, with the support of Congress, Fabián Alarcón, 
then President of Congress was sworn as head of state. However, Rosalia Arteaga, 
Bucaram’s vice-president, protested and became president for two days before 
Alarcón was restored. These events marked the beginning of the Ecuadorian political 
instability that lasted until 2005. In the economic realm, oil prices were starting to 
fall. They fell 15,99% in comparison to 1996, contributing to the future economic 
crisis.  
In the social aspect, this period presented some progress. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the percentage of the population below the line of indigence and poverty 
reached 26% and 61,8%, respectively (ECLAC, 2015). During this period, urban 
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poverty decreased 5,9 percent to 55,9% in 1997. Likewise, in 1996 government’s 
health expenditure reached its maximum with 11,06% of public spending. 
 
The sixth economic cycle (1997-2002) presented the worst economic crisis in 
Ecuadorian history. After great political instability, in 1998 a new Constitution was 
written and Jamil Mahuad -a right wing politician- was sworn as president. He 
finished the border conflict and signed a Peace Treaty with Peru. His presidential 
term, however, was characterized by the economic crisis. The fall in oil prices (-
41.9% in 1998), the effects of the natural disaster of El Niño, high inflation (52,24% 
in 1999) and finally a bank holiday that led to the bankruptcy of some of the main 
Ecuadorian banks, contributed to the economic contraction of 4,73% in 1999 and the 
substitution of Ecuador´s national currency -the sucre- with the US dollar in 2000.  
 
Due to the economic crisis, Ecuador was unable to pay its foreign debt and defaulted. 
Mahuad removed the subsidies for gas, diesel and electric energy, and in 
compensation he created a conditional cash transfer program called the Poverty Bond, 
which targeted the poorest. However, the financial crisis led to the worst social crisis 
in Ecuador´s history. Urban poverty increased in 1999 by 7.3 percentage points, 
harming 63.2% of the population. This is the highest percentage of the period 
analyzed, meaning that the social improvement reached before the crisis was fully 
reverted. Likewise, urban indigence increased in 1999 by 9.1 percentage points, 
reaching 31,1% of the population. Unemployment climbed to its maximum with 
14,4%, and inflation reached 52.2% in 1999 and 96% in 2000, while income 
inequality increased to its maximum in Ecuadorian history: 60.13 according to the 
Gini Index. Because many people were not able to find jobs in Ecuador, around 
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4,66% of Ecuador’s population between 1999 and 2002 migrated, mainly to Spain 
and the United States. 
 
Due to all these events, many social groups, specially the indigenous population, 
protested and on January 21st, 2000 the government of Jamil Mahuad was overthrown 
with the help of the Army. During three hours the country was governed by a 
Governing Board conformed by the indigenous leader Antonio Vargas, the colonel 
Lucio Guitérrez and the judge Carlos Solórzano. The next day, Mahuad’s vice 
president Gustavo Noboa was sworn as president. 
 
The seventh economic cycle (2002-2005) was characterized by the economic 
recovery but persistent political instability. During these years average economic 
growth was 5,4%, reaching its peak in 2004 with 8,21%. Inflation was falling and 
reached 2,4% in 2005, the lowest since 1962. Urban poverty and urban indigence 
reduced to 45,2% and 17,1%, respectively. Additionally, in 2002 the heavy crude oil 
pipeline (OCP) was built boosting oil production, which along with the stable oil 
prices contributed to Ecuador’s economic growth. In the political realm, Lucio 
Gutiérrez -the colonel that helped overthrow Jamil Mahuad- was elected president. 
During his mandate, Gutiérrez made pro-market decisions and maintained a stable 
economy. In his period, real minimum wage increased and income inequality 
decreased significantly. However, due to his populist trait, the indigenous groups 
accused Gutiérrez of betrayal. This accusations, along with corruption acts such as 
nepotism, contributed to him being overthrown on April 20th, 2005. 
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Finally, the eight economic cycle comprehends the years 2006-2013, and was 
characterized by the second oil boom in Ecuadorian history, economic and political 
stability, and great social progress. However, as presented in Figure 1, these 
achievements derived mostly from the changes in oil prices, specially in 2011 when 
Ecuador sold each barrel of oil at $102,77, the highest price in Ecuador´s history. In 
the same way, as oil prices dropped in 2009 due to the global economic crisis, 
Ecuador´s economy grew only by 0.56%. This dynamic is also presented by poverty. 
Since 2002 urban poverty was decreasing, but this fall was accelerated in 2006, 2010 
and 2011 when oil prices were high. In 2009 and 2013 when oil prices fell, urban 
poverty started to increase. Inequality also followed the same pattern and decreased 
until 2011 when it reached 46,21. However, in 2012 and 2013 inequality started 
increasing due to the fall in oil revenues. This cycle is also characterized by large 
social investment, which is reflected for example in education. Net primary 
enrollment for 2013 was 97,03% and net secondary enrollment reached 83,42%.  
 
Finally, unemployment decreased in this period and the real minimum wage rose, 
contributing to social progress. In spite of the fall in unemployment, 
underemployment still comprises a big part of the Economically Active Population 
(EAP). In 2008 it was 48,78% of the EAP, a year later 50,5%, and in 2013 it was 
41,25%. 
 
In the political realm, Ecuador presented its major period of stability. After Gutiérrez 
was overthrown, Alfredo Palacio took power and ruled for one year. In 2007, a left 
wing political outsider -Rafael Correa- was sworn as president and until 2013 he has 
been elected for this dignity three times. Correa has become the president with the 
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most political power in Ecuador’s democratic history. He drafted a new constitution, 
he controls all the state powers and, for the first time in history, the government 
political party has the absolute majority in the legislature. Even though political 
stability has been the result of the strong government derived from oil revenues, 
democracy has been questioned. In this sense, the second oil boom not only provoked 
economic growth, but political instability and social progress. 
 
Long run relationship between economic growth, democracy and 
human development 
 
In the period 1965-2013, Ecuador has been characterized by political instability, 
volatile economic growth, and unstable social progress. During this period Ecuador 
began exporting oil and its economy began to depend on its production. As portrayed 
in Figure 1, real GDP growth clearly follows the lagged variation in real oil prices, i.e. 
growth in Ecuador is determined by the price of oil. For instance, the economy 
decelerated when oil prices fell in 1975, 1982, 1988, 1998, 2009 and 2013, while it 
boomed when they increased during the years: 1974, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1996, 2008, 
2010, 2011. 
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Figure 1: Ecuador Real GDP Growth-Presidents-Oil Prices 
 
 
Figure 1 also shows the different governments (and presidents’ last names) the 
country had during this period. The lack of strong political institutions is obvious: 
political instability has been a constant throughout these years. In the democratic 
period (after the purple line), there were 13 presidents when considering a 4-year 
period there should have been only nine. The period of highest political instability 
began in 1997 and lasted until 2005. However, this political instability did not 
respond to economic aspects, except for the overthrowing of Jamil Mahuad, but to 
political reasons.  
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When analyzing institutionalized democracy 2  (Figure 2) and not only irregular 
government changes, we can see that democracy tends to respond to economic 
growth. For instance, after the financial crisis in 1999 Ecuador’s democracy felt 3 
points in 2000, recovering thereafter once growth resumed. 
 
           Figure 2: Ecuador real GDP growth and changes in democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The variable that clearly follows the dynamics of the economic cycle is the Human 
Development Index (HDI) (Figure 3). This index is composed of three variables: life 
expectancy, education and income per capita, representing a good proxy for social 
progress. As shown in Figure 3, the major changes in HDI respond to 
contemporaneous growth as in 1976, 1981, 1999 or 2010. Most importantly, this 
relationship between HDI and growth highlight the importance of a sustained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Democracy is measured using the DEMOC variable from Polity IV (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 
2013), which create an index of institutionalized democracy.  	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economic growth. During the crisis of 1999, HDI decreased; the only time in the 
period analyzed. 
     Figure 3: Ecuador real GDP growth and changes in HDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model  	  
To analyze the dynamics between social progress, democracy, and growth, we 
propose an econometric model that highlight the short-run and long-run relationship 
between these constructs. To specify the model, it is first necessary to identify a 
variable for each one of them. The variable that captures social progress is the Human 
Development Index (HDI), since it includes three important social dimensions: health, 
education and standard of living. Economic growth is captured by real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and for democracy an operationalized variable for 
institutionalized democracy has been selected. To capture the effect of the 
dictatorship periods, a variable that includes autocracy and democracy is used in a 
second model. As presented before, one of the determinants in the Ecuadorian 
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economy was the lagged of the change in real oil prices. For this reason, this variable 
is included in the model as an exogenous variable.  
 
We propose a Vector Error Correction (VECM) Model. This model analyzes the 
interrelationship among multiple time series, when the series are not covariance 
stationary, but are cointegrated. Cointegration between series appears when a linear 
combination of them is stationay or I(0), while each independent series is I(1). In this 
sense, a VEC is a system of equations where each variable is explained by its own 
lagged differences and the lagged differences of the other endogenous variables, plus 
a lagged error-correction term. The error correction term represents the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the series. 
Data 
 
The data used in the model includes real GDP taken from the Ecuadorian Central 
Bank (BCE), we build a Human Development Index (HDI) and real oil prices, as 
explained below. Democracy is taken from Polity IV, and we also use a dummy 
variable for dollarization. All these variables cover the period from 1965 to 2013, 
except for real oil prices for which data is only available from 1972 when Ecuador 
started to export oil. However, due to the use of first differences in the model, it has 
40 observations. 	  
HDI 
 
Since the UNDP only provides 10 observations and a continuous series since 2010 for 
Ecuador´s Human Development Index (HDI), we built a proxy for HDI. The UNDP 
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technical notes establish two steps for the construction of the HDI. The first step is to 
find the variables for the three dimensions: long and healthy life, knowledge, and a 
decent standard of living, and create the dimension indexes. As stated by the UNDP, 
the variable used to measure the first dimension is life expectancy at birth. This 
variable was taken from the World Bank, which provides a continuous series from 
1960 to 2013.  Knowledge is measured by mean years of schooling and expected 
years of schooling. Yet, for Ecuador the only variable available was mean years of 
schooling. This variable was subtracted and built using Barro and Lee dataset (2014) 
and the World Bank data. Finally, Gross National Income per capita adjusted by the 
Purchasing Power Parity measures the dimension of decent standard of living. In the 
built HDI I used Gross Domestic Product per capita as a proxy for GNI per capita, 
since the World Bank only provide a continuous series for the latter variable starting 
in 1990. 
 
To create the dimension indices the UNDP has established “natural zeros and 
aspirational goals”, as presented below: 
 
Table 1: HDI components 
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After these adjustments, each dimension index was calculated as established by the 
UNDP technical notes: 
 
1         𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 −𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 −𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒   
 
Finally, the HDI was derived by the geometric mean of the three dimensional indices: 
 2               𝐻𝐷𝐼 = (𝐼!!"#$! ∗ 𝐼!"#$%&'() ∗ 𝐼!"#$%&)!/! 
 
While we constructed the HDI, we are confident that it represents a good proxy for 
the HDI provided by the UNDP. The correlation between these two series is 0.9967 in 
levels and 0.944 in differences. 
 
Democracy 
 
Democracy is measured by democ, a variable taken from the Polity IV Project. 
Democ measures the institutionalized democracy through an additive eleven-point 
scale. This variable considers three important components: “the presence of 
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences 
about their leaders, the guarantee of civil liberties, and constraints on the exercise of 
power by the executive” (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 2013). 
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Log of Real GDP 
 
The data for Real GDP is taken from the Ecuadorian Central Bank (BCE), which 
provides a continuous series from 1965 to 2014, with 2007 as the base year. The 
model uses the Log of Real GDP. 
 
Real oil prices 
 
Since the Ecuadorian Central Bank only provide nominal oil prices from 1972 to 
2014, it was necessary to convert the variable to real terms. To convert oil prices, we 
use the United States Consumer Price Index (CPI) since Ecuadorian oil is sold in US 
dollars and the Ecuadorian inflation does not influence oil prices. We used the US 
Energy Information Administration CPI. Their method to convert nominal prices to 
real prices is the following: “divide the nominal price in a given year by the ratio of 
the CPI in that year to the CPI in some “base” period as presented below” (EIA n.d.): 
  
3       𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  𝐴 = 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  𝐴 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐼  𝑖𝑛  𝐷𝑖𝑐  2015𝐶𝑃𝐼  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  𝐴 
  
Polity  
 
Polity is a variable that takes into consideration the effect of autocracy in the political 
system .presenting a complete picture of political institutions. Since polity is the result 
of substracting the autocracy score (Autoc) from the democracy score (Democ), both 
variables of Polity IV, it ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly 
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autocratic). The autocracy score takes into consideration the competitiveness of 
political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive (Gurr, 
Jaggers and Marshall 2013). 
 
Specification of the VEC Models 
 
In order to avoid spurious relationships, we testes for a unit root in the time series and 
determined whether the variables are stationary. As presented in the table below, we 
run an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test with trend and a constant, and just with a 
constant. It is evident that all the variables in levels when taking into consideration the 
trend are not stationary or present a unit root. However, after first differentiating, no 
variable does present unit roots and can be considered stationary, i.e. all variables are 
I(1). 
 
Table 2 : Unit Root tests 
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Lag order selection  
 
VEC Model 1 
 
The lag order of the VECM including the Democ variable was chosen following the 
Final Prediction Error (FPE), the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQIC) 
method, and the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), which coincided 
that the lag order for a VAR I(1) was 2 lags (Table 3). However, since the order for a 
VEC model is one less than a VAR, in the specified VEC model one lag is needed. 
 
Table 3 : Lag order selection VECM 1 
 
  
VEC Model 2 
 
In the same way, as the lag order was chosen for the VECM including the Democ 
variable, the lag order for VECM including the Polity variable was chosen (Table 
4).In this case, the variables of the VECM also need one lag. 
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Table 4: : Lag order selection VECM 2 
 
 
Cointegration test  
 
To test for cointegration a Johansen test was implemented for both sets of series. This 
test presents one cointegrating relationships among the variables in both cases. In the 
first case, in which the Democ variable is included (Table 5), the null hypothesis 
H0=1 cannot be rejected at the 5% level (14.29<15.41). In the second case, when 
Polity is included (Table 6), the null hypothesis H0=1 cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level (10.94<15.41). 
 
Table 5: Cointegration test VECM 1 
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Table 6: Cointegration test VECM 2 
 
 
 
VECM 1 
 
The first VEC model that included the Democ variable was executed as follows: 
 
 ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃! =∝!+∝!"# 𝜃!!! +∝! ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!∆𝐻𝐷𝐼!!! + 𝛾!∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐!!!+ 𝛿!∆𝑂𝑖𝑙!!! + 𝜀! 
 ∆𝐻𝐷𝐼! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!"#𝜃!!! +∝! ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!∆𝐻𝐷𝐼!!! + 𝛾!∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐!!!+ 𝛿!∆𝑂𝑖𝑙!!! + 𝜀! 
 ∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐! = 𝛾! + 𝛾!"#$%𝜃!!! +∝! ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!∆𝐻𝐷𝐼!!! + 𝛾!∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐!!!+ 𝛿!∆𝑂𝑖𝑙!!! + 𝜀! 
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This system of equations represents the dynamics between the three endogenous 
variables in levels, which are the real GDP (GDP), the Human Development Index 
(HDI) and democracy (Democ), and the lagged in the change of real oil prices as an 
exogenous variable. The speed of adjustment parameters ∝!"#$ ,𝛽!"# , 𝛾!"#$% 
represent how GDP, HDI and democracy move back to their long-run equilibrium 
relation. Finally, the lagged differences of the explanatory variables represent the 
short-run causality on the left-hand side variables (Tao and Zestos 2002). 
 
Results VECM (1) 
 
The cointegrating equation represents the long run relationship between the Log of 
the GDP, the Human Development Index and Democracy. 
 𝜃 = 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 10.25  𝐻𝐷𝐼 − 0.088  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 − 13.38 1.11 ∗∗∗               0.020 ∗∗∗                   
 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝜃 + 10.25  𝐻𝐷𝐼 + 0.088  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 13.38 1.11 ∗∗∗               0.020 ∗∗∗                     
 
 
This equation shows that there is a positive feedback from human development and 
democracy to economic growth in the case of Ecuador. 
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Table 7: VECM 1 Estimation results  
 
 
From the VEC Model (Table 7) is evident that there exists a short-run Granger 
causality between the lagged change in oil prices and real GDP growth. This result 
coincides with the analysis presented before and highlights the importance of oil 
prices for the Ecuadorian economy. In the short-run, neither democracy nor the 
Human Development index present a relationship with real GDP growth. This 
contradicts the finding of Heo and Tan (2001), who showed that in Ecuador, 
democracy Granger causes economic growth. 
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However, there exists a positive long-run relationship between these variables, since 
the error correction coefficient is 0.023 and significant. This implies that when 
democracy and human development increase, real GDP growth will increase too in 
order to adjust to the same level. This result coincides with Feng’s (1997) 
investigation, which established that the effect between democracy and growth is 
positive in the long run. 
 
The determinants in the short-run of the HDI are: lagged HDI change, lagged real 
GDP growth and lagged change in oil prices. Intuitively, a high HDI will present a 
short-run Granger causality to the HDI in the next periods. However, lagged real GDP 
growth and lagged change in oil prices present a negative short-run relationship with 
the HDI. The former can be explained by the fact that a change in the real growth rate 
does not cause in the short-run major social development, since the resources from 
real GDP growth can be directed to other channels that do not affect HDI. The latter is 
a clear representation of the resource curse and the negative effect of oil rents on 
human development. Even though, the change in oil prices was the main determinant 
for Ecuador´s economic growth, there is a negative and direct relationship in the 
short-run between these two variables. While Ecuador concentrates all its efforts in oil 
exploitation when real oil prices changes, the country is not devoted to promote 
higher levels of education nor better health conditions, since the source of economic 
growth is oil and not human development. Additionally, oil exploitation is intensive 
in capital and not in high-skilled workers. This result ratifies the negative relationship 
regarding resource curse and human development (Karl 2007). In this sense, there is a 
negative short-run Granger causality between changes in oil prices and social 
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progress. Finally, in Ecuador democracy does not have any effect in the short-run to 
human development, in contrast to what panel data analysis present (Doucouliagos 
and Ali, 2008) (Baum and Lake, 2003). This could be explained because the periods 
in which social progress has significantly increased coincide with dictatorships or less 
democratic governments. Nevertheless, the error correction term in this equation is 
positive and significant, presenting a positive long-run relationship between these 
variables.  
 
Democracy, does not present a long-run relationship with either real GDP or HDI. 
Nonetheless, in the short-run the HDI Granger causes democracy. This supports 
previous investigation (Pourgerami 1988) (Acemoglu, Naidu, et al., Democracy Does 
Cause Growth 2015) and shows that more educated, healthier, and richer people will 
support democracy. Due to this relationship and taking into consideration that oil 
prices hinder HDI, there exists an indirect negative effect from oil to democracy. Ross 
(2001) has also presented this relationship and establishes that oil hindered political 
institutions. 
 
VECM 2 
 
The second Vector Error Correction Model portrays the endogenous relationship 
between real GDP growth rate (GDP), Human Development Index (HDI) and a proxy 
variable for political institutions (Polity), and the lagged change of real oil prices as 
an exogenous variable. The VECM is defined as follows: 
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 ∆𝐻𝐷𝐼! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!"#𝜃!!! +∝! ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!∆𝐻𝐷𝐼!!! + 𝛾!∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!!! + 𝛿!∆𝑂𝑖𝑙!!!+ 𝜀! 
 ∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! = 𝛾! + 𝛾!"#$%𝜃!!! +∝! ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!∆𝐻𝐷𝐼!!! + 𝛾!∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!!!+ 𝛿!∆𝑂𝑖𝑙!!! + 𝜀! 
 
Results VECM (2) 
 
The cointegrating equation represents the long run relationship between the Log of 
the GDP, the Human Development Index and Polity. 
 𝜃 = 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 8.76  𝐻𝐷𝐼 − 0.044  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 12.97                      0.9328 ∗∗∗     0.0111 ∗∗∗                     
 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝜃 + 8.76  𝐻𝐷𝐼 + 0.044  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 12.97                      0.9328 ∗∗∗     0.0111 ∗∗∗                     
 
As in the first VECM, this equation demonstrates that Human Development Index and 
Polity are positive correlated with GDP. 
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Table 8: VECM 2 estimation results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Vector Error Correction Model that uses Polity as a proxy for political 
institutions quality presents one difference in comparison to the former VECM that 
included the Democ variable. In this model, there exists a short-run Granger causality 
from political institutions quality (Polity) to the HDI. Since the polity variable 
considers the effect of autocracy on the democratic series, it is intuitive that after 
controlling for the autocracy in dictatorship period, better political institutions have a 
positive effect on the HDI. Hence, there exists a bivariate causality between political 
institutions and human development. This result confirms previous studies as 
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presented in Baum and Lake (2003), Doucouliagos and Ali (2008), and Acemoglu et 
al (2015).  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper examines the endogenous relationship between Ecuador’s social progress, 
democracy and growth. After estimating the dynamics of these variables through a 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and Granger causality tests, it is clear that 
the only variable that in the short-run causes economic growth is the lagged change in 
oil prices. However, in the long-run there exists a positive relationship between 
human development, democracy and growth. Regarding Human Development, in the 
short-run this variable is mainly caused by the difference in past levels of human 
development. Nevertheless, when controlling for autocracy in the political institutions 
variable, better quality of political institutions Granger causes human development. In 
the same way, in the long-run economic growth and better political institutions have a 
positive effect to human development. Likewise, this variable short-run Granger 
causes democracy. We didn’t find a long-run relationship between economic growth 
and human development to democracy. Finally, we show that although oil has a 
positive effect on economic growth, it hinders human development directly and 
political institutions indirectly. 
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